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Stormy Weather
In the four years after the "Crash" in October
1929, prices fell by 25 percent and national
income almost one-half (30 percent in "real" or
inflation-adjusted terms), while unemployment
soared fror111.5 to 13 million, or 24 percent of
the labor force. In addition, over 9,000 banks
failed - almost 40 percent of the nation's total.
This Letter provides an overview of develop-
ments during the turbulent decade ofthe 1930s,
including the controversial role of monetary pol-
icy. It also discusses the profound changes in the
Federal Reserve's structure and powers that were
enacted by the Congress, together with laws
affecting the structure and powers of banks, that
were designed to rectify many ofthe problems
believed to have contributed to and exacerbated
the Great Depression.
Two pots for every chicken
The causes ofthe Great Depression still are a
matter of considerable debate among econo-
mists. Many, such as Milton Friedman, argue
that "prevention or moderation in the decline of
the stock of money... would have reduced the
contraction's severity and almost certainly its
duration." However, Friedman also notes that
"as events unfolded, the decline in the stock of
money and the near collapse ofthe banking sys-
tem can be regarded as a consequence of non-
monetary forces in the United States and
monetary and nonmonetary forces in the rest of
the world," and that, even with a more expan-
sive monetary policy, "the contraction might
still have been relatively severe."
Observers who have emphasized the latter view
include Marriner Eccles, the Utah banker
appointed Governor of the Federal Reserve
Board by President Roosevelt in 1934. He
argued that consumption spending simply had
failed to keep pace with production during the
1920s. This, along with the enormous diversion
of funds to the stock market and the weakness in
the farm sector, led to a fundamental imbalance
in the economy.
A record peacetime tax increase in 1932 to help
balance a $5 billion budget, together with tax
increases at the state and local government lev-
els, also exerted a strong contractionary effect
upon private spending. Finally, enactment ofthe
Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1932, which raised tariffs
to the highest levels in the nation's history,
wreaked havoc on international trade. The tariff
made it difficult for foreign nations to earn dol-
lars to buy American products and to repay their
substantial World War and post-war borrowings
from the U.S., leading in turn to widespread
defaults.
The Depression had many causes, but few
would argue that the demise of nearly 40 per-
cent of the nation's banks and an attendant 35
percent net decline in the money supply were
major factors contributing to its severity. As one
Fed historian later noted, records of policy dis-
cussions, Congressional testimony and pub-
lished reports indicate that Fed officials had a
pretty good grasp of unfolding business and
financial developments, but to some extent felt a
correction for the speculation ofthe 1920s was
inevitable. For some time, they did not "antici-
pate the severity ... of the developing financial
crisis."
Brother can you spare a dime?
Following the stock market Crash, Reserve
Banks tried to give the economy a boost by pro-
gressively cutting (from 6 percent at the New
York Fed to 2112 percent in mid-1930 and to 1112
percent a year later) the discount rate - the rate
at which member banks could borrow from the
Fed. Many banks, however, feared that borrow-
ing from the Fed would be interpreted by depos-
itors as a sign of weakness. Reserve Banks even
helped member banks reduce their borrowings
by purchasing moderate amounts of u.s. gov-
ernment securities. As a result, borrowings
dropped from over $950 million at the time of
the Crash to just under $100 million at the end
of 1933.
In September of 1931, devaluation ofthe English
pound raised concerns that a drop in the dollar's
value would follow. The Reserve Banks reacted
by sharply raising discount rates (from 1V2 per-
cent to 3112 percent at the New York Fed) and
keeping the rates at the higher levels for almost
five months in aneffort to stem an outflow of
gold (which backed the currency).FRBSF
Due to the sharp drop in borrowing through the
Reserve Banks' discount windows, member
bank reserves over the entire period from the
Crash to the end of 1933 rose by only about
$400 million (17 percent), and this in response
to a net increase in System purchases and hold-
ings of government securities from $165 million
to $2.4 billion.
Moreover, due to a scramble for liquidityon the
part ofthe public through deposit withdrawals,
and on the part of banks themselves, which
chose to hold and increase rather than lend and
invest excess reserves, commercial bank loans
and investments declined by about 35 percent
and were accompanied by a comparable reduc-
tion in the money supply. Absent these develop-
ments, the increase in Fed "high powered
money" (member bank reserves and currency in
circulation) would have resulted in about a 17
percent net increase in the money supply.
New powers and structural reforms . ..
The severity of the Depression brought forth -
belatedly ~ a spate of legislation designed to
rectify perceived failings in the banking and
financial structure and to strengthen materially
the Fed's ability to deal with the problems that
had developed. In 1932, legislation was passed
to enhance the System's ability to conduct open
market operations. It allowed U.S. government
securities as well as gold and "eligible" com-
mercial paper to be used as collateral for Federal
Reserve Notes, thus easing the constraints ofthe
gold cover-eligible paper requirement. Member
banks also were permitted to borrow from the
Reserve Banks on any "sound asset" rather than
just on short-term, "self-liquidating" paper.
The Banking Act of 1933 gave the Reserve
Banks power to vary member bank reserve
requirements within legally specified minimum/
maximum ratios, and also authorized them to
lend to nonmember banks and other entities
under "unusual and exigent circumstances
(since eighty percent ofthe banks that failed
since 1929 were nonmembers)." Member banks
were prohibited from engaging in investment
banking, including the underwriting and pur-
chase of stocks for their own portfolios. And, in
the wake of the massive bank failures, com-
pulsory federal deposit insurance was instituted
for federally chartered banks and savings and
loan associations. In 1934, the Securities and
Exchange Commission was established and the
Fed was given authority to set stock-margin
requirements.
Increased independence . .. and centralization
The Banking Act of 1935 mandated other
sweeping changes in the structure and operating
procedures of the System. The Federal Reserve
Board was renamed the "Board of Governors"
and its Chief Executive Officer, "Chairman."
The Chief Executive Officers ofthe Reserve
Banks were renamed "President" (rather than
"Governor"), and their appointment made sub-
jectto approval by the Board of Governors.
To better insulate the Board from political
pressure from the Executive Branch, the Treasury
Secretary and Comptroller were removed from
ex officio membership, and Board members'
terms were increased to 14 years. Carter Glass
cited his own actions, as well as those of other
Treasury Secretaries, as evidence that "the
Federal Reserve System is used in an unwise
way by the Treasury and under thedominance
ofthe Secretary ofthe Treasury."
Most important, the Open Market Committee,
which determined the Fed's open market sales
and purchases of securities, was completely
revamped by centralizing control in the Presi-
dentially appointed Board of Governors. The
Committee was reconstituted to include the
seven-member Board and five of the Reserve
Bank Presidents, the latter to serve in a voting
capacity on a rotating basis except for perma-
nent membership by the President ofthe New
York Fed.
Congress rejected Chairman Eccles' efforts to
amend the Federal Reserve Act to provide a
more specific policy guide than simply "accom-
modating commerce and business," which he
considered a "glittering generality." Eccles
favored making itthe "duty" of the Board "to
promote conditions conducive to business sta-
bility and to mitigate ... unstabilizing fluctua-
tions in the general level of production, trade,
prices and employment, so faras may be possi-
ble within the scope of monetary action." He
emphasized the dominant influence on eco-nomic activity of the money supply and its rate
of utilization (velocity), but argued that policy-
makers also "have to take into account factors
other than purely the mathematical or mechan-
ical factors of money."
Differing views
As in 1913 when the Federal Reserve was cre-
ated, many bankers viewed the reforms with
considerable hostility. Whereas California's
A. P. Giannini strongly supported the proposed
reforms, a number of his East Coast contempo-
raries considered them "instruments of despotic
authority" and even a step towards Commu-
nism. Representative of the latter view was New
York banker James Warburg, who was unhappy
not only with the proposed reforms but with
Chairman Eccles "Keynesian" analysis ofthe
role ofthe money supply and the rate of its
expenditure in influencing the volume of busi-
ness activity. For its part, the American Bankers
Journal (July 1933) argued that "the guaranty
(insurance) of bank deposits violates every con-
ception of a capitalistic society (and) will not
work."
Some voices were quite strident. Prior to his
defeat in the 1934 election, Congressman (and
banker) Louis McFadden (R-PA) first tried to
impeach President Hoover, and then the Federal
Reserve System, for "high crimes" including
theft on behalf of its alleged "masters" - Great
Britain and the "international bankers". Various
"shirtists" hurled their barbs, while "Radio
Priest" Charles Coughlin demanded "Honest
Money," and denounced the "Shylocks" of the
Federal Reserve as tools of the "prophets of
evil" - the Warburgs and Rothschilds.
Darkness at noon
Following a fairly vigorous recovery which com-
menced in 1934, the economy again slipped
into a recession in 1937, with unemployment
rising to 19 percent from 14 percent. The down-
turn was widely attributed to the imposition of
an excess profits tax and an increase by the Sys-
tem in member bank reserve requirements to
their legal maxima. The Fed's actions resulted
from concern over rising prices (wholesale
prices rose about 7 percent in 1937) and the
inflationary potential of a soaring volume of
bank excess reserves, which exceeded the level
that could be absorbed by open market sales of
u.S. governments from the System's portfolio.
As a result of the downturn, the excess profits
tax was repealed and reserve requirements were
reduced. The economy again moved upward,
and, under the impact of soaring gold inflows
and an increasingly war-nervous Europe, mem-
ber banks' excess reserves rose to over $6 billion
by the end of 1939 - almost matching the vol-
ume of required reserves.
Conclusion
The decade of the 1930s witnessed unparalleled
peacetime intervention by the federal govern-
ment in the nation's economic life not only
through an expanding budget but through laws
and regulations affecting virtually every sector of
activity. In 1939, real GNP finally recovered to
its 1929 level, but unemployment still amounted
to 17 percent of the labor force. Moreover, in
the view of many observers, the expansionary
effects of government spending, which at its
peak was only one-half the level attained in
World War I, had been offset to a very consider-
able extent by rising taxes at the state and local
government levels.
In April 1939, the Board of Governors reaffirmed
to the Congress the System's objective - not yet
formalized by the Congress - of helping to
achieve "the fullest practicable realization of the
country's human and natural resources." But it
also noted that "since the money supply,
however measured," was at record levels, the
difficulty of achieving its objective "must not be
in the scarcity but in the inadequate use of the
existing supply" (at this time, the discount rate
was 1 percent and the short-term T-bill yield
only .02 percent). It added that "there are many
phases of economic life that are not susceptible
of control through money means alone."
The role of the "velocity" of money and the
proper consideration that should be given to fac-
tors other than money was to remain at the core
of debate among economists and policymakers
decades later. However, as the decade of the
Thirties came to an end, it was gathering war
clouds in Europe and Asia that would again
shape the course of the economy - and mone-
tary policy.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Selected Assets and Liabilities
largeCommercial Banks
Loans, Leases and Investments] 2 200,710 - 153 12,039 6.3
Loans and Leases] 6 181,658 - 130 10,579 6.1
Commercial and Industrial 52,409 318 - 413 - 0.7
Real estate 66,298 - 31 3,898 6.2
Loans to Individuals 38,547 23 5,777 17.6
Leases 5,672 8 396 7.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,846 36 219 2.0
Other Securities2 8,206 - 58 1,240 17.8
Total Deposits 198,327 -3,126 5,766 2.9
Demand Deposits 46,118 -2,853 2,430 5.5
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 31,006 - 228 2,993 10.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,767 - 220 1,972 15.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,441 - 54 1,363 1.0
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 45,790 - 17 2,007 4.5
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,016 41 - 1,158 - 2.9

















] Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change